Nail in the Java Key Store coffin

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


Content

- Purpose/mechanics of Key Store files
- Key Store types
- Purpose/mechanics of JKS
- Weaknesses and Cracking
- Recommendations



Purpose of Key Store files - User view





Not How Asymmetric Crypto Works

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$\epsilon \rightarrow c$	Secure https://blogs.adobe.com/psirt/?page_id=146	* °
	And the absence of the second	April 2014
	GAEIABkFAlm/2LAFCQHhM4AJEIbAD8Kvh3YWAhsMAACz+g/+KmbnChEUZXdo	March 2014
	ZIvPzphw3KvZQHWCY+5qGqdoxNkfkUSKhkzC0M51Kq7emVpvXYrMRdJRHxFP	February 2014
	83HIahA5UiufsDt7QlMwVRGtJYxhH+TNZBBbDBVQ1JQxuC3mH7F/tFHb9N1G	January 2014
	kURUwa2fdDBPw2+DOWa2+iVhcPhfB2iy9exs2txXjgPx67aZi70Jw44ixvpY	December 2013
	TWs/N5I68XQsyuB5Qw0jtXKioQyTOLmeUFmJR2Ui5FK+t58Xus44mRCujEUn	November 2013
	YDqDmxKDnhssEVNWZ4KWs2uvNXNwlnZcHVSYXukf3F1CWp07ESCOecdqbv10	October 2013
	Cs+vLivxiksh33xqZWnD78xv92t2Ggp2a41gBOaaCjx2irqZ9RHIv0YzNfQz	September 2013 July 2013
	yz5XYEGI2iCrvdStrbZfX1Dqsllrqs/pZRbV48KbfubDvGZuNR3hrsfmfsgr	June 2013
	zkESOQmpuKhj/Es3CKjdafLDc8HOyVhJ+n4tvWXyRpYEhuDh/tzeDuuB9vfG	May 2013
	QA9TNhSpAp51HFJklmd9knWbExJ0srUbK2QVmVn9CZx/sdUfwDWp1GeANLsO	April 2013
	MRN1r3Irk1bZ0bFH+nrcJQZ5+sDzHGNe4P9Dt30yvFHoyS1BkRndLuawSlqh	March 2013
	LJyYLUvFjL3i3jbiNT1NKldwqaL2i9OuRAuHthoFGOKIqr6hmtOYzUem/cl+	February 2013
	ZlRwd77Vmfc=	January 2013
	=Q0c7	December 2012
	END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK	November 2012
		October 2012
	BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK	September 2012
	Version: Mailvelope v1.8.0	August 2012 June 2012
	Comment: https://www.mailvelope.com	May 2012
		April 2012
	xcaGBFm/2KMBEADbwToJM3BCVE1OeC22HgVEqNEDppXzuD2dgfKuy0M4tx2L	March 2012
	De7GkPjo6AOsw4yi8bakLiidpw5B0J/AR1VtIjIDEmS0F9MREIcV0UKyA5qV	February 2012
	c9BafZnAicY7nezkIJUmyLcIVMC60pqSHzo0Ewy2PZjxzcI4vDGhHmcgfV5X	January 2012
	R+duYld3LtVI+A/5jv326LB16bCNts/t0bW2T0LraMPoCtdH84Z4tPcyp335	December 2011
	s8/dZ2C+EoMD4iX1kIymZ1kgEfZNvcs1sRUXy27sL01VHcYmi6UNWCeeHOu2	November 2011
	2yJxMiBCniozBKEUwcR6ysg97nnq633dN9mf7V30PS3zAjhE0Hvmzg3B/Nfo	October 2011
	qzy2dAEU/JDUBhiAo+xr9VF3ZPOoC8JySORgyUm/2t3TTBaH+DnfsUBiqo5U	September 2011
	2T0n8x2R1FWxyZYNCTku5JOvPgRBft13DSyJD7LDDps62nghpaVb34eprwuk	August 2011 June 2011
	qIk0TMRu9mB4EQc+cNFR3ZpN1AKj+H0b/TUJwCJpVju2/3g0wgdqHh+OQ1vC	May 2011
	Nm8vIGnQEWQ30WqnH/UFoh3RPJ+WqnDq88NmqBq8I4aNV4u8MqoObd/zrtVX	April 2011
	kAwYHbIZLo925NjFyPuuxhWiCotKen18dZefB8aB81RjYuIMnCJ0GQus+JG8	March 2011
	TJyEesNdK/q8HD5h1kCRSzMHD1+Ra3z/1+FFFIwARAQAB/gkDCA7HXpjNu7yW	February 2011
	released demonstration and the restantion deport who had be	December 2010

YBVIglTandp2qwxLZTA0Jm3YMOwvBojE4ZDL41VZBh2sBphQ15CLu1x7MUrD

December 2010



Key Store Types

- Various options in Java
 - Java Key Store (JKS)
 - JCEKS
 - BouncyCastle Key Store (BKS)
 - PKCS#12



Usage of JKS

- Default format in all Java and Android versions
- Oracle databases (TLS keys), Apache Tomcat (TLS keys), Android Studio (app signature keys)...
- Java + public key cryptography




Usage of JKS - Android Studio

. 😐 🔿 😐		Generate Signed	APK						
Key store path:									
			Create new	Choose existing					
Key store password:									
Key alias:									
Key password:									
<u>R</u> emember passwords									
? Cancel				Previous Next					




How does JKS Work?



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How does JKS Work?



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


Usage of JKS - Android Studio

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? Cancel				Previous Next					




Key Store Password only for Integrity






How does JKS Work?



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How does JKS Work?



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


Public Key Not Encrypted





How does JKS Encryption Work?





Encryption of the Private Key

- Private Key XOR Key Stream = Encrypted Private Key
- Encrypted Private Key XOR Key Stream = Decrypted Private Key
- How is the Key Stream generated for JKS?



Key Stream Generation


- Invented a Password Based Encryption (PBE) using SHA-1
- Generating the key stream:
 - A = SHA1(password + IV)
 - B = SHA1(password + A)
 - C = SHA1(password + B)

Key Store File IV Public TO 10110110100 10100101010 1010101011 10111010011

- ...
- Key Stream = Concatenate A, B, C...




Decryption of the Private Key





Not so Obvious Weakness





Not so Obvious Weakness

- "Only one SHA-1 application is required to derive the first keystream byte. Since DER encoded keys contain a lot of structure in their first bytes, [...] makes a dictionary-based cracker highly efficient." - cryptosense.com
- Cool... but where is the PoC?
 - Is that even feasible in practice?



Not so Obvious Weakness - PoC

 For password cracking, we only need to do: 1.SHA1(password candidate+IV)
 2.XOR first 20 bytes of encrypted key = first 20 bytes of decrypted key
 3.Check first 20 bytes looks like a private key



The first 20 Bytes of a Decrypted Private Key

- PKCS#8, DER encoding, ASN.1
- In theory:
 - OID 9 bytes long "somewhere at the start"
 - 0x2a864886f70d010101 (rsaEncryption)
 - Best solution: "Search" for OID



The first 20 Bytes of a Decrypted Private Key

- In practice:
 - "Search" for OID is inefficient
 - Let's look at thousands of private keys and brute force...
 - Lucky: Fixed values 16 out of 20 bytes

RSA all: 0x30??????00300d06092a864886f70d010101 DSA 512: 0x30??????3081a806072a8648ce3804013081 DSA rest:0x30??????003082012c06072a8648ce380401 EC (256):0x30??????1306072a8648ce3d020106082a86



Not so Obvious Weakness - Optimisation

Example for an RSA key

 SHA1(password candidate+IV)
 XOR first 20 bytes of encrypted key =
 first 20 bytes of decrypted key
 Check if first 20 bytes are
 0x30???????00300d06092a864886f70d010101




Not so Obvious Weakness - Result

- Example for an RSA key
 - 1.SHA1(password candidate+IV)
 - 2.Check if first 20 bytes correspond to the precalculated 16 bytes
- Implemented in the hashcat password cracker tool to run on GPUs (thanks atom!)
 - It uses a weakness in SHA-1 to be even faster



One SHA-1 calculation for password cracking





Attacking a JKS File



Attacking a JKS File

- All alphanumeric passwords of length 8
 - 8 hours on a single NVidia 1080 GPU



Recommendations

- Never do your own Crypto
- Refactor your Java Software
- Don't use JKS
 - Good passwords (length 12+), keep file secret
 - PKCS#12 default for upcoming Java 1.9
 - Prediction: JKS will stay for a long time
 - "Existing keystores will not change"
 - "Keystores tend to be long-lived"
- More details in POC||GTFO 0x15 journal



Thank you for your Attention

Questions?

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Teaser Question 1

• How do you know which fingerprint to expect (RSA, DSA 512, DSA rest, EC, etc.)?



The First 20 Bytes of a Decrypted Private Key

RSA all: 0x30???????00300d06092a864886f70d010101 DSA 512: 0x30??????3081a806072a8648ce3804013081 DSA rest:0x30??????003082012c06072a8648ce380401 EC (256):0x30??????1306072a8648ce3d020106082a86

- But how do you know which fingerprint to expect?
 - Public Key is not encrypted, just check

...



Teaser Question 2

 You don't know all twenty bytes of a fingerprint (the question marks), how do you know you didn't guessed the wrong password?



So many question marks!

RSA all: 0x30??????00300d06092a864886f70d010101

- Yes, not 100% probability that the password also matches
- An earlier implementation relied on fewer fixed bytes and had to check if the entire key decrypts properly after finding a candidate...
- But 1/2¹²⁰ probability for a failure, which means we never hit it for password brute-forcing



Teaser Question 3

 If no Private Key Password is specified, the Key Store Password is used. Could we attack the Key Store Password then? If no, why not? If yes, why don't we?




Crack the Key Store Password?

- Default:
 - If no Private Key Password is specified it is set to the same value as the Key Store Password
- If the default case applies (same passwords), we can crack any of them
- Actually nearly all other password crackers do it
 - They crack the wrong password sometimes...




Key Store Password - Integrity Check






Key Store Password - Integrity Check



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Why not crack the Key Store Password?

- Which cracking approach has better performance?
- More data go into the SHA-1 calculation, whereas otherwise it is only password+IV
 - Benchmarking showed that cracking the private key directly is more efficient
- Plus it also works in the non-default case (different passwords)

